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DUE PROCESS AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL LIEN: 
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Cheryl Kessler Clark' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA)l provides the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) with three alternatives when the agency 
has determined that response action is required at a hazardous waste 
site. The EPA may issue an administrative cleanup order;2 file an 
action in federal court seeking an order compelling cleanup;3 or pro-
ceed to clean up the site with "Superfund" money and seek reim-
bursement from the responsible party in a subsequent cost recovery 
lawsuit. 4 Despite the tremendous liability for damages and fines that 
may arise from each of these alternatives, the "potentially respon-
sible party" (PRP) has no opportunity to seek judicial review of EPA 
action or raise defenses to CERCLA liability, prior to the EPA 
initiating an enforcement or cost recovery action. 5 
• J.D., University of San Francisco, 1980; B.A., Duke University, 1975; Member of bars of 
California and District of Columbia. This Article was submitted in partial fulfillment of an 
LL.M. degree in Environmental Law at George Washington University. The author would 
like to thank Elizabeth Glass Geltman for her advice and encouragement in the preparation 
of this Article. 
I Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1988)) 
[hereinafter CERCLAj. 
2 CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). 
3Id. 
4 CERCLA §§ l04(a), 107(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a). 
5 CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The EPA thus wields an enormous amount of 
potentially unchecked power in investigating and cleaning up hazardous waste sites. The EPA 
itself admits that the CERCLA provision which allows it to issue an administrative order 
directing the PRP to take remedial action (section 106(a)) is "one of the most potent admin-
istrative remedies available to the Agency under any existing environmental statute." Peter 
D. Van Cleve, Recent Development Informal EPA Action Under CERCLA: Problems of 
203 
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CERCLA also authorizes the EPA to file a lien on the contami-
nated property to recoup its cleanup expenditures. This lien is cre-
ated by operation of law as soon as the EPA spends Superfund 
money, and becomes effective upon filing of the notice of lien. 6 CER-
CLA does not require that the property owner receive notice of the 
lien or a hearing prior to the filing of the lien. 7 When considered in 
conjunction with CERCLA's bar of pre-enforcement judicial reviews 
of EPA action, the lien provision presents serious constitutional 
problems. 9 
Many states have enacted statutory schemes which, similar to 
CERCLA, authorize state environmental agencies to clean up haz-
ardous waste sites and to seek reimbursement for expenditures. 10 
Judicial Review, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 317, 321 (1987). See infra part III for 
a discussion of pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA action under CERCLA. 
6 Section 107(1) provides in pertinent part: 
All costs and damages for which a person is liable to the United States ... shall 
constitute a lien in favor of the United States upon all real property and rights to 
such property which (A) belong to such person; and (B) are subject to or affected by 
a removal or remedial action. 
The lien imposed by this subsection shall arise at the later of the following: (A) 
The time costs are first incurred by the United States with respect to a response 
action under this chapter. (B) The time that the person referred to in paragraph (1) 
is provided . . . written notice of potential liability. 
CERCLA § 107(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(L)(1}-(2). 
7 [d. EPA's power to encumber real property is entirely unchecked by due process safe-
guards. See discussion infra part II.D.2. 
8 Throughout this paper, the phrase "pre-enforcement judicial review" refers to "judicial 
review of EPA actions prior to the time that the EPA or a third party undertakes a legal 
action to enforce an order or to seek recovery of costs for the cleanup of a hazardous waste 
site." See Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 564 n.8 (D. Mass. 1990). 
9 See discussion infra part IV.C. 
10 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.08.005-.080 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-410 to -417,8-
7-509 to -516 (Michie 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-22-101 to -105 (West 1990 & Supp. 
1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-451 (West Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-112, 
para. 1022.2 (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-8.7-2, -8 (West 1990 
& Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3453 to -3455 (Supp. 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 224.876-.877 (Baldwin Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2198 (West 1989); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1318-A to -B (West Supp. 1991); MD. ENVIR. CODE ANN. §§ 7-218 to 
-221 (1987 & Supp. 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, §§ 4, 11 (Law. Co-op. 1988 & Supp. 
1992); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.32(10e), (12) (Callaghan Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 115B.17 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-17-29 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 260.480 (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-704, -711, -715 (1991); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 459.755, .760 (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:6, :10 (1990 & 
Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4-7, -8 
(Michie 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-31O.6 (1989); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.22 
(Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 466.205 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.501, .507 
(Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-160, -180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 68-212-204 to -207 (1992); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.185, .191 
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Twenty-one states now allow the imposition of environmental liens. 11 
Many of these state-imposed liens exceed the parameters of the 
CERCLA lien by attaching not only to the real property subject to 
cleanup, but also to revenues, personal property, and real property 
not related to the contaminated site. 12 The vast majority of the state 
lien provisions suffer from the same lack of due process safeguards 
as does the CERCLA lien. 
Recently, in Reardon v. United States,13 the first federal appellate 
court to consider the constitutionality of environmental liens de-
clared that the CERCLA lien violates the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 14 This Article analyzes the constitutionality of 
both federal and state environmental liens in light of Reardon and 
other cases involving due process challenges to CERCLA. Section 
II discusses the court opinions issued in the Reardon litigation. 
Section III analyzes the issue of whether CERCLA bars pre-en-
forcement judicial review of due process claims. Section IV ad-
dresses the issue of whether the CERCLA lien violates due process. 
Section V discusses due process and state environmental liens. In 
Section VI, this Article presents a model for an environmental lien 
statute that satisfies both due process requirements and environ-
mental enforcement concerns. 
II. THE REARDON TRILOGY 
A. The Facts 
The property at issue was a sixteen-acre parcel called Kerry Place, 
located between a residential neighborhood and a manufacturing 
(West 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1283 (1984 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-
2500 to -2502 (Michie Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-5G-l, -5 (1989). 
11 See ALASKA STAT. § 46.07.075 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-417, -516 (Michie 1991); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-112, para. 
1021.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.7-10.7 (West Supp. 1992); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 455B.396 (West 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.877 (Baldwin Supp. 1991); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 
(West 1989); MD. ENVIR. CODE ANN., § 7-266 (Supp. 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 
(Law. Co-op. 1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.32(16a) (Callaghan Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 514.671-.676 (West 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-720 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :1O-b (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10.23.11f(f) (West 1992); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3734.22 (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 466.205 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 35, § 6020.509 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-209 (1992); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.194 (West 1992). 
12 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :1O-b (1990). See discussion infra part V. 
13 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991). 
14 [d. at 1510, 1517-24. 
206 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:203 
plant. 15 The Reardons had purchased Kerry Place after the previous 
owner separated the plot from a larger twenty-five-acre parcel that 
contained an electrical equipment manufacturing plant. 16 The Rear-
dons intended to develop the land commercially.17 When polychlori-
nated biphenyl (PCB) contamination was discovered on both Kerry 
Place and the adjacent industrial property, the EPA conducted a 
CERCLA removal action on both properties. 18 After the cleanup, 
the Reardons subdivided Kerry Place, sold some lots to commercial 
developers, and retained the rest. 19 The EPA then notified the Rear-
dons that, as owners of the contaminated property, they could be 
liable for the cost of the removal action as well as for future long-
term remedial action. 20 Four years later, the EPA filed a notice of 
lien on the Reardons' remaining lots pursuant to section 107(1) of 
CERCLA.21 The Reardons filed a declaratory relief action seeking 
to remove the lien from their property. 22 
B. Reardon I: The District Court23 
1. Statutory Claims 
In their motion for a preliminary injunction requesting the court 
to restrain the EPA from imposing the lien on Kerry Place, the 
15 Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 559-60 (D. Mass. 1990). 




20 Id. After a hazardous waste site is discovered and a preliminary investigation conducted, 
the EPA routinely sends PRP notice letters to a wide variety of people, some of whom may 
not be very closely connected with the actual release, such as past owners, transporters, and 
generators. Barnett M. Lawrence, Comment, Pre-enforcement Review Under CERCLA: 
Potentially Responsible Parties Seek an Early Day in Court, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,093, 10,094 (1986). All notice letters inform the PRPs of their potential liability under 
section 107 to reimburse the government for any Superfund-financed activities, and of the 
EPA's power under section 106 to order the PRPs to clean up the site. Id. at 10,094-95. 
Neither an administrative nor judicial hearing is available for contesting a PRP designation. 
Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289, 293 (6th Cir. 1991). A person may remain a 
PRP for years, subject to administrative orders, yet the EPA may never prosecute the PRP 
for cleanup implementation or reimbursement. Id. 
21 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 561. 
22 Id. 
23 A discussion of the opinions by the trial court and the appellate panel is included herein 
to illustrate the development and analysis of issues relating to sections 113(h) and 107(1) of 
CERCLA. 
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Reardons raised two statutory challenges to the lien. First, they 
asserted that they were "innocent landowners" under section 107(b) 
of CERCLA, and as such were not liable for cleanup costS.24 Second, 
they alleged that the EPA exceeded its authority under section 107(1) 
of CERCLA by placing a lien on all their property rather than just 
the parcels affected by the cleanup. 25 
In deciding that it had no jurisdiction to consider these claims, the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts relied 
on section 113(h),26 which precludes judicial review of the EPA's 
selection of a response action prior to the EPA initiating an enforce-
ment or cost recovery lawsuit.2:1 The court held that because the lien 
is an "enforcement activity" related to EPA removal or remedial 
actions, challenges to the validity of the lien fall within the bar of 
section 113(h).28 
24 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 559. Commonly known as the ''innocent landowner" defense, 
section 107(b) provides that a property owner is not liable for CERCLA damages caused by 
a third party if the owner exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances and 
took precautions against foreseeable third party actions. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(b). 
25 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 559; see supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
26 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 563-65. The court also refused to find jurisdiction under section 
702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at 565. The district court held that the 
section 702 presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action is overcome by a 
statute's specific language or legislative history that precludes judicial review. Id. The court 
also rejected the argument that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 2410, which allows an 
individual to sue the United States in a quiet title action but does not create an independent 
basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 566. 
:!1 Id. at 564. Section 113(h) provides in pertinent part: 
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction ... to review any challenges to removal or 
remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued 
under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one of the following: 
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or damage 
or for contribution. 
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section 9606(a) of this title or to 
recover a penalty for violation of such order. 
(3) An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of this title. 
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens suits) .... 
(5) An action under section 9606 of this title in which the United States has moved 
to compel a remedial action. 
CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
26 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 564-65. The court rejected the Reardons' argument that because 
the removal action was complete, litigation of their liability would not delay cleanup and thus 
not frustrate the purposes of CERCLA. The court noted that the EPA's expenditure of funds 
and personnel to litigate liability for prior cleanup would hamper the ongoing long-term 
investigation and remedial action. Id. at 565. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, sitting en bane, disagreed with this conclusion. See infra notes 39-43 and 
accompanying text. 
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2. Constitutional Claim 
In addition to their statutory claims,29 the Reardons also raised a 
claim under the United States Constitution. The Reardons asserted 
that the lien violated their constitutional right to procedural due 
process as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 3o Again, the court 
first assessed whether, in light of section 113(h), it had jurisdiction 
to consider this claim. The court found that although the plain lan-
guage and legislative history of section 113(h) indicate a Congres-
sional intent to bar pre-enforcement review of all challenges to EPA 
actions under CERCLA,31 Congress does not have the power to 
completely deny judicial review of constitutional claims.32 Thus, sec-
tion 113(h) does not limit the court's authority to review a consti-
tutional claim where, as in the Reardons' situation, the alleged con-
stitutional wrong is immediate and ongoing, and Congress has not 
provided another forum in which to assert the claim. 33 
29 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
30 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 566. The Fifth Amendment provides that no one shall ''be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 
V. 
31 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 568. The court reached this conclusion despite the Supreme 
Court's recognition of a presumption that Congress does not intend to proscribe all judicial 
review of administrative action, particularly of constitutional claims. [d. at 566. In light of 
this established presumption, the Reardon court's conclusion as to legislative intent serves to 
emphasize the unequivocal nature of the language of section 113(h) and the absolute terms in 
which this section was discussed in Congress. See id. at 567. 
For example, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee commented that section 
ll3(h) was intended to be comprehensive and cover "all lawsuits, under any authority," 
concerning EPA response actions, as well as "all issues that could be construed as a challenge 
to the response .... " [d. In addition, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 
as well as various House committees, reported that section 113(h) was intended to codify the 
position that "there is no right of judicial review of the [EPA's] selection and implementation 
of response actions until after the response actions have been completed .... " [d. at 568 & 
n.lO. 
The House Judiciary Committee did voice concern that section 113(h)'s preclusion of pre-
enforcement review ''raises constitutional due process concerns .... " [d. at 568 n.ll. The 
Committee's suggested amendments, however, did not provide for constitutional challenges 
and were not incorporated into the final bill. [d. 
A review of the same legislative history led the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, in the third opinion of the Reardon trilogy, to conclude that Congress focused 
its concerns "on the problems that would arise if courts reviewed the merits of particular 
EPA actions." Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1516 (1st Cir. 1991) (emphasis in 
original). It is likely that Congress did not consider section 113(h)'s effect on constitutional 
claims before the statute was enacted. See id. at 1515-17; see also id. at 1527 (Cyr, J., 
dissenting) (" ... Congress did not consider the plight of innocent owners indefinitely deprived 
of their property rights and the right to challenge an invalid CERCLA lien. "). 
52 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 569. 
33 [d. at 570. 
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The court noted that generally section 113(h) merely delays judi-
cial review until after the EPA brings an enforcement action. This 
opportunity for review is adequate in most circumstances where the 
alleged constitutional wrong does not occur prior to such a lawsuit. 
The court distinguished the lien situation, however, because with a 
lien the constitutional harm occurs immediately upon the EPA in-
curring cleanup expenses and giving notice of the lien to the land-
owner. Thus, the owner's property interest is affected without any 
due process safeguards, either before or after the lien is created. 34 
The court then reviewed the due process claim on the merits and 
concluded that the lien does not constitute a deprivation of a sub-
stantial property interest protected by the due process clause. 35 
Although the CERCLA lien clouds title and affects the right to 
alienate the property, the lien does not interfere with the owners' 
ability to use, possess, or transfer the property.36 Because the lien 
did not violate the Reardons' due process rights and thus the Rear-
dons were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional 
claim, the court denied the Reardons' request for a preliminary 
injunction. 37 
C. Reardon II: The First Circuit Panel 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, a three-judge panel reversed the district court on the ground 
34 [d. at 569-70. 
35 [d. at 570-73. The court relied on the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Speilman-
Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974), in 
which the United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that the restriction 
imposed on the alienation of property by a mechanic's lien was not a significant property 
interest protected by the due process clause. Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 572. In reversing the 
trial court's ruling on this issue, the appellate court in Reardon specifically distinguished a 
mechanic's lien from the CERCLA lien. See infra text accompanying notes 66-70. 
36 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 572-73. 
37 [d. at 573. The court also found that the Reardons had failed to satisfy the other three 
elements required for equitable relief: irreparable injury will result if the injunction is not 
granted; such injury outweighs the harm which granting the injunction would impose on the 
opposing party; and the public interest will not be adversely affected by the granting of the 
injunction. [d. at 570, 573. 
First, the court found that the nature of the Reardons' injury was unclear, insofar as they 
benefited substantially from the EPA's cleanup of Kerry Place. [d. at 573. Second, the harm 
to the EPA in granting the injunction could be great. [d. If the EPA were enjoined from 
imposing the lien, it would have no secured interest against subsequent purchasers of lots at 
Kerry Place, and could not guarantee recovery of its expenditures. [d. Third, the public 
interest favors denying an injunction, because the lien gives notice of the government's interest 
to subsequent purchasers, the lien is part of the overall cleanup plan and remedy of a public 
health problem, and the lien secures expenditures of public funds and ensures that responsible 
parties will reimburse the public for hazardous waste cleanup. [d. 
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that section 113(h) does not preclude judicial review of statutory 
challenges to the CERCLA lien. 38 
The court reasoned that section 113(h) does not purport to bar 
judicial review of all activities relating to removal or remedial ac-
tions, but only "enforcement activities" related thereto, and the 
removal or remedial actions themselves.39 Although section 113(h) 
does not define "enforcement activities," the court's reading of the 
language of other CERCLA provisions and the statutory structure 
as a whole led it to conclude that "enforcement" specifically refers 
to measures to force compliance with EPA-ordered response actions. 
Thus, the court decided the lien is neither a removal action, nor a 
remedial action, nor an enforcement activity related thereto. 4O The 
court held that imposition of the lien is a step in the cost recovery 
process, rather than an "enforcement activity" within the scope of 
section 113(h).41 
In addition, the appellate court found that the lien clearly affects 
a legal right and thus is in more urgent need of judicial review than 
other administrative actions under CERCLA.42 Moreover, allowing 
judicial review of challenges to the lien would not affect the under-
lying purpose of section 113(h}-to eliminate obstacles to prompt 
hazardous waste cleanup.43 The court remanded the case for further 
proceedings, without ever reaching the due process issue. 
D. Reardon III: The First Circuit En Banc 
On petition for rehearing, the court of appeals, sitting en banc, 
vacated the panel's decision. 44 In concurrence with the district court, 
the appellate court held that because imposition of the lien is indeed 
an "enforcement activity," section 113(h) bars pre-enforcement ju-
dicial review of statutory challenges to the lien.45 In considering the 
38 Reardon v. United States, 922 F.2d 28 (1st eir. 1990)(withdraum), 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,639 (lst eir. Dec. 20, 1990). 
89 Reardon, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,641. 
40 [d. 
41 [d. 
42 The court distinguished the lien from an EPA payment demand letter, which has no legal 
force or effect. [d. at 20,641-42. 
43 [d. at 20,642. The court observed that (1) the lien litigation would cause no delay either 
to completed cleanup activities or to implementation of pending remedial plans; (2) in terms 
of financial burden, it was irrelevant whether the EPA would be required to defend the lien 
"now or later"; and (3) the Reardons already had engaged in voluntary cleanup, so allowing 
the lien action to proceed would not "hinder their impulses in that regard." [d. 
44 Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1512 (1st eir. 1991). 
46 [d. at 1512-14. The court reasoned that when the government files a lien on property to 
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Reardons' due process claim, however, the appellate court departed 
from the district court's opinion and held section 107(1) to be uncon-
stitutional. 46 
1. Section 113(h) Does Not Bar Pre-enforcement Review of 
Constitutional Challenges to CERCLA. 
The appellate court disagreed with the district court that section 
113(h) does not bar pre-enforcement judicial review of the Reardons' 
due process claim.47 This holding was based on four findings. 48 
First, section 113(h) bars only review of challenges to the EPA's 
administration of CERCLA-that is, its selection of the proper re-
sponse action.49 The section does not foreclose review of constitu-
tional challenges to CERCLA itself, which do not involve the merits 
of any particular removal or remedial action. 50 Second, section 113(h) 
does not express a clear congressional intent to bar constitutional 
challenges to CERCLA.51 Third, allowing review of the Reardons' 
due process claim would not frustrate the underlying purposes of 
section 113(h)-to avoid piecemeal litigation and potentially incon-
sistent results and to ensure prompt, unhampered EPA response 
action. 52 Finally, the section's legislative history indicates that Con-
gress focused its concern on barring judicial review of the merits of 
particular EPA actions and did not clearly intend to bar review of 
constitutional challenges. 53 
secure payment of liability for removal and remedial actions, it is seeking to enforce CER-
CLA's liability provision. Id. at 1512. Thus, filing a lien is an "enforcement activity." Id. In 
further support of its conclusion, the court relied on the legislative history of section 113(h). 
Id. During floor debate, several senators explained that this section was intended to delay 
contests to a party's liability for cleanup costs. Id. at 1513-14. 
46 Id. at 1510, 1523-24. The sole dissenter in Reardon concluded that the CERCLA lien is 
not an "enforcement activity" and thus challenges to the lien are not barred from pre-
enforcement judicial review. See id. at 1528 (Cyr, J., dissenting). The dissent further opined 
that the CERCLA lien statute reasonably could be interpreted to permit a prompt post-
deprivation hearing of the Reardon's innocent landowner claim, thereby satisfying the due 
process analysis required by Doehr and Mathews. Id. at 1530. 
47Id. at 1514. 
48 See id. at 1514-15. 
49 Id. at 1514. 
50 Id. The court, however, emphasized that its holding does not extend to all constitutional 
challenges. Id. at 1514-15. A constitutional challenge to the EPA's administration ofCERCLA, 
and thus to its selected response action, may be barred from pre-enforcement review by 
section 113(h). Id. at 1515. 
51Id. at 1514-15. 
52 Id. But the court noted that even if its decision hampers the EPA's collection efforts, it 
does not "lightly assume that Congress intended to ease EPA's path even at the expense of 
violating the Constitution." I d. 
511 Id. at 1516. The court also found support for its conclusion in McNary v. Haitian Refugee 
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2. Section 107(1) Violates the Due Process Clause. 
In addressing the merits of the due process claim, the court first 
analyzed whether section 107(1) authorizes the taking of a significant 
property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.54 In answering 
this query in the affirmative, the court relied primarily on Connect-
icut v. Doehr,55 in which the Supreme Court held that even the 
temporary or partial impairment of property rights that attachments 
and liens entail are sufficient to merit due process protection. 56 Be-
cause the CERCLA lien-just as the attachment lien in Doehr-
clouds title, limits alienability, and affects current and potential 
mortgages, the lien deprives the owner of a significant property 
interest within the meaning of the due process clause. 57 
N ext, in determining what process is due in the environmental 
lien situation, the court applied the well-established Mathews test, 
which requires a balancing of the following three factors: the affected 
private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the govern-
ment's interest. 58 
a. The Affected Private Interest 
Although the CERCLA lien does not deprive the property owner 
of possession and use of the property, it does affect significant in-
terests, as enumerated in Doehr.59 The deleterious effects of a CER-
Center, Inc., 111 s. Ct. 888 (1991), which held that a provision in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act barring judicial review of agency action did not preclude review of general 
constitutional challenges to agency practices and policies. Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1517. 
54 [d. 
65 Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991). In Doehr, the plaintiff sued the defendant 
for assault and battery not involving the defendant's property. Pursuant to Connecticut law, 
the plaintiff filed a prejudgment attachment on the defendant's home. [d. at 2109. As a 
prerequisite to the court's issuance of the attachment lien, the law required only that the 
plaintiff present an affidavit of probable cause. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52.287e (1991). The 
Supreme Court unanimously held that the statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of real 
estate without prior notice or hearing, or a showing of extraordinary circumstances, or bond 
requirement violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 
at 2109. 
56 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1518. The Supreme Court in Doehr explained the harm caused by 
a lien: 
For the property owner like Doehr, attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the 
ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces 
the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even 
place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause. 
[d., citing Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2113. 
57 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1518. 
58 [d. This test originated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
59 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
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CLA lien on property interests include clouding title, impairing the 
ability to alienate or encumber the property, tainting credit ratings, 
and placing existing mortgages in default. 60 
The lien's impact on property interests is particularly acute, in 
that the notice of lien may be filed well before cleanup is completed 
and thus does not state a definite amount of indebtedness.61 In such 
a situation, potential buyers or lenders are unable to identify a limit 
on the government's interest and, as a result, may be reluctant to 
invest in the property. 62 
b. The Current Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and the Value of 
Additional Safeguards 
The risk that the lien may be wrongfully filed and erroneously 
deprive the owner of significant property interests is great consid-
ering the extremely fact-intensive nature of the two requirements 
for a valid lien under section 107(1): the encumbered parcel is "subject 
to or affected by" the EPA's response action, and the owner is liable 
for CERCLA costs. 63 CERCLA, however, provides no procedural 
safeguards against the filing of an improper lien.64 The first hearing 
60 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1518. 
61Id. at 1519. The Reardons' situation illustrates the prejudicial and potentially absurd 
result of such open-ended liability. After initially receiving notice of the lien, the Reardons 
requested clarification as to the amount of liability secured by the lien. The EPA responded 
that the Reardons' share of cleanup costs would total $335,709. Id. at 1511. The EPA warned, 
however, that this amount was quoted for settlement purposes only and was not binding as 
to the Reardons' potential liability. Id. Six months after giving notice of the lien, the EPA 
selected a long-term remedy for the site, which was expected to cost in excess of $16 million. 
Id. at 1511. 
62 This problem is compounded in states that authorize environmental superliens. A gov-
ernmental lien of unlimited amount with superpriority essentially renders all other interests 
in the property worthless. See infra notes 145--52 and accompanying text. 
63 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1519. See supra note 6 for the text of section 107(1). The dissenting 
opinion in Reardon disagreed that the CERCLA lien statute involves a "substantial risk of 
unwarranted deprivation" of property rights, reasoning that the CERCLA lien and the 
attachment lien in Doehr serve very different purposes. Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1528-29 (Cyr, 
J., dissenting). The Doehr attachment lien could issue on a showing that there is probable 
cause to believe that judgment will be rendered for the plaintiff, based on the plaintiff's "one-
sided, self-serving, and conclusory submission." Id. at 1528. The potential for unwarranted 
attachment in that situation is great. Id. at 1529. The CERCLA lien, however, is based on 
an administrative determination that a contaminated site needs cleanup and the investment 
of public resources at the site. See id. Moreover, elaborate statutory safeguards and admin-
istrative procedures for selecting response actions afford protection against an unwarranted 
lien. Id. 
64 Possible procedural safeguards include a pre-attachment judicial hearing, an inlmediate 
post-attachment hearing, a probable cause requirement, a bond requirement, or an authori-
zation of actions against the government for double damages for wrongful liens. Id. at 1519-
20. 
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the property owner is likely to receive is at the EPA-initiated en-
forcement proceeding or cost recovery action, which may be too far 
in the future to satisfy due process requirements. 65 
c. The Government's Interest 
Due process requirements may be relaxed if the lienor has a pre-
existing interest in the property, if there are exigent circumstances, 
or if additional procedural requirements would entail undue fiscal or 
administrative burdens. 66 None of these exceptions, however, justi-
fies section 107(1)'s failure to require notice and a hearing prior to 
the filing of the lien. 
Where the lienor has a heightened interest in the property, the 
court may uphold procedures that are otherwise suspect under a due 
process analysis. 67 Thus, for example, traditional due process re-
quirements may be excused for attachments pursuant to vendor's or 
mechanic's liens, where, according to a voluntary agreement be-
tween the contracting parties, the lienor owns or has worked to 
improve the property sought to be encumbered. 68 Where the lienor 
has indisputedly rendered the contracted service, the landowner is 
presumed to be liable. 69 In contrast, at the time the CERCLA lien 
attaches, the parties have no contractual relationship and no court 
has determined that the government has a valid lien on the property. 
The EPA has no prior judicially recognized interest in the attached 
property and thus may not avoid providing the property owner with 
notice and a hearing. 70 
Likewise, exigent circumstances, such as the imminent transfer 
or encumbrance of the property, may allow the postponement of a 
65 An enforcement or cost recovery action may be brought several years after the notice of 
lien is filed. See id. "Since the government may take its own sweet time before suing, and 
since the removal or remedial action may itself take years to complete, the lien may be in 
place for a considerable time without an opportunity for a hearing." [d. In that event, the 
owner's property is encumbered for years without ever having a judicial determination as to 
liability or validity of the lien. [d. Another serious injury may occur if the EPA files a lien 
and many years later decides not to sue the owner for cleanup costs. 
66 [d. at 1520-23. 
67 [d. at 1520-21. 
68 [d. at 1520-22. 
69 [d. at 1522. 
70 [d. at 1521. The dissenting opinion disgreed. It noted, "[u]nlike the plaintiff in Doehr, 
whose 'only interest in attaching the property was to ensure the availability of assets to satisfy 
his judgment if he prevailed on the merits of his action,'" the government in Reardon had 
invested in cleanup and expected to spend millions of dollars more at the site. [d. at 1530 
(Cyr, J., dissenting)(quoting Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2115). The EPA thus had a legitimate 
interest in any increase in property value as well as recovery of its costs. [d. 
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hearing until the attachment is effected.71 CERCLA, however, does 
not require that exigent circumstances exist at the time of filing the 
lien, nor was there any evidence in Reardon suggesting that a trans-
fer or encumbrance of the property was imminent.72 Finally, the 
minimum additional procedural requirements of notice of an intention 
to file a notice of lien and provision for a hearing, if the property 
owner claimed that the lien was invalid, would impose "significant, 
but not overwhelming, administrative burdens on the govern-
ment."73 
In conclusion, the Reardon court found that section 107(1) provides 
far less process than the state of Connecticut provided in the at-
tachment law declared unconstitutional in Doehr. In that case, a 
judge considered the merits ex parte before authorizing the attach-
ment, the plaintiff could attain an immediate post-attachment hear-
ing, and a double damage remedy was available to compensate for 
error. "Here, there is no prior neutral proceeding, no double damage 
remedy, and no post-attachment review for what may be many 
years."74 To pass constitutional muster, the CERCLA lien must 
provide, at the least, notice and a pre-attachment hearing. 75 
71 Id. at 1522. 
72 Id. The court noted that under CERCLA, even an imminent transfer rarely would 
constitute an exigency because a subsequent owner who knew of the contamination would 
also be liable for cleanup costs, and the property could be sold to satisfy a judgment against 
the second owner. Id. Cf Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883, 889 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(although section 106 gives EPA broad power in emergencies, it does not authorize EPA to 
enter private property for response-planning operations in nonemergency situations); Indus. 
Park Dev. Co. v. EPA, 604 F. Supp. 1136, 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (unilateral administrative 
action under section 104 to enter site and effect cleanup should be saved for extreme emer-
gencies, such as where site is abandoned; where PRP is known, prompt hearing is appropriate). 
73 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1523. In comparison with the number of administrative orders and 
PRP notice letters the EPA issues every year, the use of the CERCLA lien is a relatively 
rare occurrence. For example, according to the EPA, approximately 10,000 PRP letters were 
outstanding nationwide in 1987. In re Combustion Equip. Assoc., Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 40 (2d 
Cir. 1988). See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 
1989) (discussing magnitude of administrative problem if PRPs are allowed to maintain de-
claratory relief actions challenging PRP designation). In contrast, in that same time period 
during the first year after the enactment of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 (SARA), the EPA filed only 22 CERCLA liens nationwide. Robert S. Bozarth, 
Environmental Liens and Title Insurance, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 305, 314 (1989). Because of 
the relative infrequency of CERCLA liens, the tremendous burden of time and expense that 
would result from pre-enforcement judicial review of other EPA activities under CERCLA is 
simply not a real threat in the lien context. Considering the substantial harm that may result 
from an erroneous environmental lien, any relatively minor burden on the government must 
yield to due process requirements. See Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1523. 
74 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1523. 
76Id. Because due process may be tailored to fit the situation, the pre-attachment hearing 
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Prior to Reardon, no court had analyzed the constitutionality of 
the CERCLA lien, although numerous courts had considered due 
process challenges to other aspects of CERCLA. By necessity, Rear-
don has departed from much of this precedent, due to the unique 
nature of the interests affected by the lien and the lien's immediate 
and irreparable harm. The following two sections compare Reardon 
with prior case law and demonstrate the soundness of the circuit 
court's holding. 
III. PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW OF DUE PROCESS CLAIM UNDER 
CERCLA 
A. The Pre-SARA Controversy 
Prior to the enactment of the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986 (SARA),76 CERCLA did not expressly pro-
hibit pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA actions. Despite the 
presumption in favor of federal court jurisdiction to review actions 
of federal administrative agencies,77 the majority of courts faced with 
pre-enforcement CERCLA challenges refused to assert jurisdiction 
over such claims, primarily because of two factors: the public health 
nature of the statute, and the lack of harm to PRPs from the denial 
of early review. 78 
In focusing on congressional intent, courts paid great deference 
to CERCLA's purpose to authorize prompt response to environmen-
tal emergencies without the need to await judicial determination of 
may require that the EPA merely show probable cause to believe that the subject property 
falls within the parameters of section 107(1)(1). See id. at 1522. 
76 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986) [hereinafter SARA]. SARA amended CERCLA to include, inter alia, the section 
113(h) bar of pre-enforcement judicial review. See infra part IlI.B. 
77 Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1986). 
78 See id. at 314-15. See also Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 
1386 n.lO (5th Cir. 1989); Dickerson v. Adm'r, EPA, 834 F.2d 974,977 (11th Cir. 1987). A few 
courts rejected subject matter jurisdiction over pre-enforcement claims due to lack of finality 
and ripeness, prerequisites for judicial review of agency action under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. See, e.g., Pacific Resins & Chern., Inc. v. United States, 654 F. SUpp. 249, 
254 (W.D. Wash. 1986); B. R. Mackay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1297 
(D. Utah 1986). For example, in Pacific Resins, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington held that a PRP notice letter is not reviewable agency action 
because the letter has no legal force, and the PRP can suffer no harm until the EPA pursues 
an enforcement action. Pacific Resins, 654 F. Supp. at 252. Such an analysis creates a virtual 
bar to all pre-enforcement review, in that all administrative activity under CERCLA prior to 
completion of cleanup falls short of final agency action. 
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liability.79 Courts believed pre-enforcement review of EPA response 
action would frustrate that purpose by delaying the cleanup process, 
increasing response costs, and discouraging voluntary cleanup.80 In 
effect, the courts acknowledged that Congress had given its blessing 
to the EPA to act first and litigate later. 81 
The courts' rejection of CERCLA claims perhaps was rendered 
more palatable by their concomitant conclusion that barring pre-
enforcement review did not prejudice the rights of PRPs or expose 
them to irreparable harm. To the contrary, the PRPs would have 
adequate opportunity, during a later EPA-initiated lawsuit, to pres-
ent defenses to liability and challenges to the cost efficiency of the 
EPA's chosen remedial action.82 Neither liability nor penalties could 
accrue prior to judicial review. 83 
Several important pre-SARA decisions, however, did find that 
although CERCLA implicitly barred pre-enforcement review of chal-
lenges to the merits of EPA action, the courts did have jurisdiction, 
pursuant to section 113(b) of CERCLA, to consider due process 
challenges to CERCLA itself.84 Although these decisions offer no 
79 See, e.g., Wagner Seed, 800 F.2d at 315 (pre-enforcement review of EPA's remedial action 
is contrary to CERCLA's policies). 
80 See, e.g., id. (no pre-enforcement review of act of God defense to administrative cleanup 
order); Wheaton Indus. v. United States EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986) (no pre-
enforcement review of issue of control over remedial investigation and feasibility study); Lone 
Pine Steering Comm'n. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1115 (1986) (no review of EPA's record of decision and choice of remedial action); J. 
V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. Adm'r, EPA, 767 F.2d 263,264 (6th Cir. 1985) (no review of EPA's 
choice of response action); Pacific Resins, 654 F. Supp. at 252-54 (no review of EPA letter 
giving notice of potential liability for cleanup costs); B. R. Mackay 633 F. Supp. at 1294 (no 
review of EPA letter demanding reimbursement subsequent to completed removal action but 
prior to cost recovery action). 
81 See, e.g., Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 885-86. The Lone Pine court noted that section 104 of 
CERCLA allows the EPA to proceed without an express judicial identification of responsible 
parties. [d. at 886. The ultimate determination of liability may not be reached until after 
lengthy judicial proceedings, during which the environmental threat or damage may increase. 
[d. "To delay remedial action until the liability situation is unscrambled would be inconsistent 
with the statutory plan to promptly eliminate sources of danger to health and the environ-
ment." [d. This concern not to disturb CERCLA's purpose overshadowed consideration of 
APA requirements. See id. at 886-88. At least one court held that in light of CERCLA's 
structure, statutory scheme, objectives, and legislative history, pre-enforcement judicial re-
view even of final agency action was prohibited. B. R. Mackay, 633 F. Supp. at 1297 (no 
review where EPA had completed cleanup and referred case to Department of Justice for 
collection, but cost recovery action had not yet been filed). 
82 See, e.g., United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497,506 (7th Cir. 1986). 
83 Pacific Resins, 654 F. Supp. at 253-54 (challenge to PRP notice letter not reviewable 
because letter does not require PRP to take action, is not final determination of liability, and 
had no legal force; penalties or liability accrue only after cost recovery or enforcement action). 
84 See Wagner Seed, 800 F.2d at 315; Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 738 
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substantive analysis of the issue, they do indicate that pre-enforce-
ment review is available where the PRP may suffer irreparable harm 
if judicial review is delayed. 85 
Thus, the courts in pre-SARA cases consistently held that CER-
CLA barred pre-enforcement review of EPA action, based on the 
courts' reluctance to frustrate the statute's important public health 
purposes, as well as the adequate opportunity for PRPs to raise 
defenses and constitutional claims in the later enforcement action. 
Where the courts did find jurisdiction over pre-enforcement due 
process claims, the PRP potentially faced irreparable harm that a 
later judicial hearing could not remedy. 86 
B. The Post-SARA Controversy 
SARA amended CERCLA to include section 113(h), which codified 
judicial precedent prohibiting pre-enforcement review of EPA action 
under CERCLA.87 Post-SARA decisions, however, are still split as 
to whether section 113(h) bars pre-enforcement review of constitu-
tional claims. In reasoning analogous to that of pre-SARA opinions, 
courts that have refused to review such claims relied predominantly 
on the following factors: the language of section 113(h) does not 
explicitly except constitutional claims from the pre-enforcement re-
view bar;88 SARA's legislative history indicates an intent to prohibit 
(D. Kan. 1985); Aminoil, Inc. v. United States EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 74 (C.D. Cal. 1984). In 
Wagner Electric, for example, the plaintiffs sought an injunction staying an EPA administra-
tive cleanup order. 612 F. Supp. at 737. The plaintiffs asserted that they had no opportunity 
to participate in the administrative decision-making process, the order failed to give adequate 
notice of the required actions, and the potential liability for daily penalties or punitive damages 
for noncompliance chilled the exercise of the plaintiffs' right to challenge the order. 612 F. 
Supp. at 740. The court held that it had no jurisdiction to consider the first two claims, which 
related to the merits of the administrative order. [d. The third claim, however, related to the 
constitutionality of CERCLA itself, and the court found jurisdiction to review the claim under 
section 113(b). [d. Section 113(b) provides generally that the federal district courts "shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies" arising under CERCLA. CERCLA 
§ 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b). 
85 For example, in Wagner Seed, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the PRP's 
act of God defense to compliance with a section l06(a) cleanup order, because such pre-
enforcement review of the EPA's remedial actions is contrary to CERCLA's policies. 800 F.2d 
at 315. The court, however, found jurisdiction under section 113(b) to consider a due process 
challenge to CERCLA's penalty provisions where the PRP had to forego defenses to liability 
in order to avoid imposition of noncompliance penalties. 800 F.2d at 315-16; see infra part 
III.B.2. 
86 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
87 Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 564. See supra note 27 for the text of section 113(h). 
88 See, e.g., Barmet, 927 F.2d at 293. In challenging the EPA's proposal to list the plaintiff's 
site on the National Priority List (NPL) and the EPA's invitation to the plaintiff to participate 
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pre-enforcement review of all claims;89 pre-enforcement review 
thwarts prompt responses to environmental hazards, encourages 
piecemeal litigation, and wastes the EPA's limited resources;90 and 
the bar does not prejudice PRPs because section 113(h) merely 
delays judicial review, constitutional challenges may be raised at a 
later hearing, and no penalties may arise prior to judicial review of 
constitutional claims. 91 
C. Reardon Correctly Decides the Issue 
In holding that section 113(h) does not bar pre-enforcement review 
of due process claims, the Reardon court addressed the same four 
factors but reached directly opposite conclusions as to each of them. 92 
Most fundamental to the due process analysis are the circuit court's 
findings that pre-enforcement review will not frustrate CERCLA's 
purpose and will prevent irreparable harm to the PRP. 
First, pre-attachment review of a due process challenge to the lien 
will not hamper the cleanup of hazardous substances. The resulting 
invalidation or modification of the lien, at worst, may hamper the 
EPA's collection efforts. 93 
Second, a bar to pre-attachment review irreparably prejudices the 
PRP. Upon the filing of the lien, the property is encumbered im-
mediately and the owner is immediately subject to injury. For ex-
in the remedial investigation and feasibility study (RIIFS), the plaintiff in Barrnet argued that 
even if section 113(h) bars judicial review of constitutional claims, Congress has no power to 
restrict the court's jurisdiction that effectively would violate the plaintiff's due process rights. 
[d. at 294. The court found no merit in this argument because the plaintiff could challenge 
liability in an enforcement action, the EPA's right to recover was limited by the requirement 
that recoverable costs be consistent with the National Contingency Plan, an~ the plaintiff 
could supplement the administrative record during the later judicial review. [d. 
89 See, e.g., Barrnet, 927 F.2d at 293. 
90 See, e.g., id.; South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. United States EPA, 681 F. Supp. 1244, 
1251 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (no pre-enforcement review of NPL listing, PRP letter, and EPA's 
rejection of plaintiff's RIIFS). 
91 See Barrnet, 927 F.2d at 295 ("The CERCLA statutory scheme merely serves to effectuate 
a delay in plaintiff's ability to have a full hearing on the issue of liability and does not 
SUbstantially affect the adequacy of such a hearing."); Precision Nat'l Plating Serv., Inc. v. 
United States EPA, No. 90-6813, 1990 WL 191968, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 1990) (barring 
pre-enforcement review of due process challenge to CERCLA's penalty provisions did not 
prejudice plaintiff even where plaintiff had cooperated with state environmental agency for 
18 years, took remedial action, and had data indicating contamination levels did not create 
emergency); South Macomb, 681 F. Supp. at 1252. 
92 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. 
93 See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513, 1515 (1st Cir. 1991). Neither will such 
review run counter to section 113(h)'s purpose to avoid piecemeal litigation and inconsistent 
results, because resolution of a due process claim is a purely legal issue. [d. 
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ample, the lien may destroy credit ratings, sale or lease opportuni-
ties, or potential loan transactions. A subsequent judicial hearing 
invalidating an erroneous lien cannot recompense this harm. 94 Thus, 
whereas section 113(h) merely affects the timing of judicial review 
in other situations, in the lien context, the section acts as a complete 
preclusion of meaningful access to the courts. 
The strength of Reardon's analysis of the pre-enforcement review 
issue lies in its distinction from the rationale of courts which denied 
pre-enforcement review of due process claims,95 and its consistency 
with the thinking of courts which felt compelled to consider consti-
tutional claims due to the threat of irreparable harm. 96 
IV. CERCLA AND DUE PROCESS 
Litigants have asserted claims of due process violations in various 
contexts in CERCLA litigation. The two predominant challenges are 
that CERCLA's bar of pre-enforcement judicial review of agency 
action and its penalty and treble damages provisions violate the due 
process clause. In analyzing these claims, courts have allowed con-
sideration of the public's interest in environmental cleanup to over-
ride that of the PRP's constitutional right to notice and a hearing. 
The CERCLA lien, however, presents its own unique factors which 
prohibit a departure from traditional due process requirements. 
A. Procedural Due Process97 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
94 Id. at 1520. As noted in Doehr, an individual with an immediate need or opportunity to 
sell a property can neither do so, nor otherwise satisfy that need or recreate the opportunity. 
111 S. Ct. at 2118. The same applies to a parent in need of a home equity loan for a child's 
education, an entrepreneur seeking to start a business on the strength of an otherwise strong 
credit rating, or simply a homeowner who might face the disruption of having a mortgage 
placed in technical default. Id. 
95 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text. 
97 Litigants can also challenge CERCLA on substantive due process grounds. See William 
A. Montgomery, Jr., Recent Development, Constitutional Implications of CERCLA: Due 
Process Challenges to Response Costs and Retroactive Liability, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 279, 285-87 (1987). Substantive due process requires that the challenged law 
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. Id. at 285-86. 
In the area of social and economic legislation, the police power is broadly defined to include 
virtually any health, safety, or general welfare goal. Id. at 285 n.36. Thus, it is rare to find 
such regulations struck on due process grounds. Id. The courts have held that reimbursement 
to the EPA for response costs incurred prior to the enactment of CERCLA and the retroactive 
1993] ENVIRONMENTAL LIENS 221 
law. "98 Due process requires that a party have the opportunity to be 
heard whenever the government seeks to deprive it of a constitu-
tionally protected interest. 99 The courts have recognized, however, 
that the procedural requirements of notice and hearing may vary 
depending on the circumstances. 1OO Particularly in the public health 
area, due process does not require access to the courts prior to final 
agency action. 101 It is sufficient that there is at some stage an op-
portunity for hearing and judicial determination.102 This tenet is 
consistent with the accepted principle that public welfare statutes 
are to be interpreted broadly to accomplish their regulatory pur-
pose. 103 
A review of the two main contexts in which courts have analyzed 
procedural due process challenges to CERCLA illustrates that as 
long as PRPs have their day in court at some time prior to suffering 
legal deprivation, the overriding public health and environmental 
cleanup concerns allow the EPA to act without judicial supervision 
and without offending due process. 104 
imposition of liability under CERCLA do not offend substantive due process. See, e.g., United 
States v. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984). In reaching the same conclusion 
regarding the retroactivity of the New Jersey Spill Act, one court stated, "due process does 
not prohibit retroactive civil legislation unless the consequences are particularly harsh and 
oppressive. . . . Although retroactive application may impair property rights, when the 
protection of the public interest so clearly predominates over that impairment, the statute is 
valid." Kessler v. Tarrats, 476 A.2d 326, 330 (N.J. 1984). Thus, the public interest in envi-
ronmental cleanup predominates over substantive, as well as procedural, due process concerns. 
98 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
99 Frank B. Cross, Procedural Due Process under Superfund, 1986 B. Y. U. L. REV. 919, 
937 (1986). 
100 United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 691-92 (1st Cir. 1987) (due 
process not offended by EPA's written request for information and notice that failure to 
respond might subject PRP to penalties). 
101 Lone Pine Steering Comm'n v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d 882,885-86 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
To exemplify this proposition, the Lone Pine court cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), which upheld the government's right under the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to close a mining operation when it 
threatened public health and imminent environmental damage. Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 885. 
Allowing the mining company to challenge the government's action after mining had ceased 
satisfied due process requirements. Id. at 885. 
102 Id.; Aminoil, Inc. v. United States EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 72-73 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (in 
emergency, due process may require only a hearing after governmental action). By analogy, 
public emergencies justified denial of a hearing in cases involving consumer protection from 
impure food products, seizing articles used in the commission of a crime, and avoiding disrup-
tion of public schools. Cross, supra note 99, at 942-43. 
103 United States v. Laughlin, 768 F. Supp. 957, 965 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (due process does not 
require that government prove defendant's knowledge in criminal prosecution for alleged 
illegal storing and disposing of hazardous waste). 
104 See infra notes 105-30 and accompanying text. 
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B. Due Process Challenges to CERCLA 
1. Bar of Pre-enforcement Review 
Parties seeking to enjoin EPA action under CERCLA have argued 
that section 113(h) violates due process because it denies them a 
hearing prior to the EPA's selection of remedy, compilation of the 
administrative record, expenditure of funds, or implementation of 
cleanup.lo.') Because CERCLA limits judicial review in the later en-
forcement action to the administrative record,l06 without pre-en-
forcement review PRPs have no meaningful opportunity to challenge 
EPA actions. 107 This results in irreparable harm where, for example, 
the EPA selects a remedial action which is not the most effective or 
cost-efficient. lOB In such a situation, if the PRP is unable to place its 
own studies in the administrative record, the reviewing court will 
not be apprised of information necessary to the PRP's defense. 109 
The courts have overwhelmingly rejected claims that the lack of 
pre-enforcement review violates the due process clause. 110 First, the 
PRP can suffer no legal deprivation until after the judicial deter-
mination of liability, award of damages, or imposition of fines. lll 
Second, at the delayed hearing, the PRP has the opportunity to raise 
all defenses to liability, including the argument that the EPA action 
100 See, e.g., Barmet, 927 F.2d at 294 (selection of response action); Dickerson v. Adminis-
trator, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978 (lIth Cir. 1987) (selection of response action); J. V. Peters & 
Co., v. Adm'r, EPA, 767 F.2d 263,264 (6th Cir. 1985) (cleanup implementation and expenditure 
of funds); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. United States EPA, 775 F. Supp. 1027, 1039 (W.D. Mich. 
1991) (selection of remedial action and issuance of record of decision); United States v. Rohm 
Haas Co., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 672, 679 (D. N.J. 1987) (selection of response action and devel-
opment of administrative record). 
106 Section 113G) limits judicial review "of any issues concerning the adequacy of any re-
sponse action taken or ordered by the President" to the administrative record. The decision 
in selecting the response action must be upheld "unless the objecting party can demonstrate, 
on the administrative record, that the decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not 
in accordance with law." CERCLA § 113G), 42 U.S.C. § 9613G). 
107 See, e.g., Cooper, 775 F. Supp. at 1035 (p1aintiffunsuccessfully tried to enjoin EPA from 
adopting remedial action plan and issuing record of decision until plaintiff allowed to place its 
own studies into record). To ensure public participation in the development of the administra-
tive record on which the selection of response actions and judicial review are based, SARA 
added requirements of notice of the proposed response plan, opportunity to comment, public 
meetings, and administrative response to comments. CERCLA § 113(k), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k). 
An administrative hearing at which PRPs may appear to present evidence and contest the 
EPA's proposed plan, however, is not required. 
108 Barmet, 927 F.2d at 294; Dickerson, 834 F.2d at 978; Cooper, 775 F. Supp. at 1035-36. 
109 Cooper, 775 F. Supp. at 1035-36. 
110 See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
III J. V. Peters, 767 F.2d at 266; Cooper, 775 F. Supp. at 1039. 
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was not consistent with the National Contingency Plan and thus not 
reimbursable. 112 Finally, the PRP is not foreclosed completely from 
presenting additional materials to supplement the administrative 
record during judicial review. 113 
2. Penalty and Treble Damages Provisions 
A PRP who fails to comply with an administrative cleanup order 
without sufficient cause may face the imposition of daily fines and 
punitive damages of up to three times the amount of actual EPA 
cleanup expenditures. 114 Prior to SARA, litigants challenged these 
penalty provisions as violative of due process. For example, a PRP 
who complied with a cleanup order but was later determined not to 
be liable under CERCLA had no right to sue the EPA for reim-
bursement of its expenditures. 115 Because there was no opportunity 
to raise defenses to liability at a pre-enforcement hearing, the PRP 
was faced with the Hobson's choice of disobeying the cleanup order 
and risking fines and punitive damages, or complying with the order 
112 Barmet, 927 F.2d at 294; Dickerson, 834 F.2d at 978; Cooper, 775 F. Supp. at 1039. 
113 Barmet, 927 F.2d at 294; Cooper, 775 F. Supp. at 1039. Although section 113G) of 
CERCLA limits judicial review of EPA action to the administrative record, it also provides 
that "applicable principles of administrative law shall govern whether any supplemental ma-
terials may be considered by the court." CERCLA § 113G), 42 U.S.C. § 9613G). 
At least one court has concluded that limiting judicial review to the administrative record 
violates due process. In United States v. Hardage, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma's application of the three-prong Mathews test weighed in favor 
of de novo review of the EPA's preferred remedy. 663 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (W.D. Okla. 1987). 
The affected private interest was great where the remedy potentially would cost $70 million; 
the risk of erroneous deprivation was high where the PRPs were limited in their opportunity 
to investigate the site, develop data to rebut the EPA's conclusions, and review administrative 
records; the public interest was better served by de novo review where the same EPA staff 
members selected the remedy and evaluated the PRPs' comments. Id. at 1288-89. Cf United 
States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 679 F. Supp. 859, 863-64 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (due process 
does not require de novo review of EPA's remedy selection because CERCLA provides public 
comment period after publication of feasibility study and before remedy selection). 
See also Kristin M. Carter, Note, Supe1j'und Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986: Limiting Judicial Review to the Administrative Record in Cost Recovery Actions by 
the EPA, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1152, 1153--54 (1989), for an excellent analysis of why section 
113G) violates the due process clause by depriving PRPs of a meaningful right to challenge 
the EPA's selected remedial action. This note observes that courts erroneously assume that 
the hearing requirements of SARA afford PRPs an opportunity to submit effective presen-
tation. Id. at 1172-73. The author proposes that without allowing cross-examination of agency 
personnel during the cost recovery action, PRPs are unable to rebut the presumption of 
agency expertise and will rarely be able to prove that the EPA acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 
Id. at 1174. 
114 CERCLA §§ 106(b)(1), 107(c)(3); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(I), 9607(c)(3). 
116 Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 739 (D. Kans. 1985). 
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and expending cleanup money.1l6 The PRP then had no right to 
reimbursement from the Superfund, if the PRP was judicially de-
termined not liable and there were no other solvent, locatable, or 
determinable responsible parties.117 In such a situation, it was ar-
gued, the delayed judicial review of liability or of the EPA's choice 
of remedial action did not prevent the irreparable harm from risking 
noncompliance penalties or expending nonrecoverable cleanup 
funds. llS 
This position was based on Ex parte Young1l9 and its progeny. 
This line of cases held that due process guarantees the right to 
contest the validity of an administrative order without the challeng-
ing party necessarily having to face substantial penalties if the suit 
is lost. 12o Regardless of the ultimate determination on the merits, 
due process requires some real opportunity to challenge administra-
tive action. Such an opportunity does not exist where penalties are 
so great that noncompliance and judicial review cannot be risked. 121 
The result is the same as if the law provided for no judicial review 
at all. 122 
Confronted with this argument, the courts found the CERCLA 
penalty provisions troubling, at best. 123 To preserve CERCLA's con-
stitutional integrity, the courts looked to the Supreme Court's qual-
ification of Young, which established that providing a good faith 
defense to a statute that penalizes noncompliance with an adminis-
trative order cures any potential due process violation.124 Thus, the 
116 Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 388-89 (8th Cir. 1987). 
117 Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1986); Wagner Elec., 612 F. 
Supp. at 741. 
118 Solid State, 812 F.2d at 388-90; Wagner Seed, 800 F.2d at 312; Wagner Elec., 612 F. 
Supp. at 742-43. 
119 Ex part,e Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
120 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d 1115, 1119 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); Wagner Elec., 612 F. Supp. at 743. 
121 Brown, 527 F.2d at 1119. 
122 Wagner Elec., 612 F. Supp. at 743 (citing Young, 209 U.S. at 147). 
123 One court actually enjoined the EPA from assessing penalties and treble damages under 
sections 106(b) and 107(c)(3) of CERCLA. See Aminoil, Inc. v. United States EPA, 599 F. 
Supp. 69, 76 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The court's ruling was based on its conclusion that the PRP 
was likely to succeed on the merits of the claim that CERCLA's penalty and treble damages 
scheme violates due process. [d. The statutes provide no opportunity for a hearing prior to 
the issuance of an administrative order, and there is no procedure through which the PRP 
can challenge the validity of the order or penalties. [d. In the PRP's subsequent motion for 
summary judgment on the due process issue, the court denied the motion, finding that section 
107(c)(3) is constitutional because it provides for a good faith defense. Aminoil, Inc. v. United 
States, 646 F. Supp. 294, 299 (C.D. Cal. 1986). See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of how the good faith defense cures due process defects. 
124 Wagner Elec., 612 F. Supp. at 743-44. 
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courts interpreted CERCLA's penalty provisions to allow assertion 
of a good faith defense to the imposition of punitive damages. 125 As 
a result of this interpretation, fines and treble damages may not be 
assessed against a PRP who fails to comply with an EPA order in 
the reasonable belief that he or she has a valid defense to the order. 126 
Moreover, due process is not offended, because the imposition of 
penalties is subject to judicial discretion and may occur only after 
the EPA prevails in an enforcement or cost recovery action. 127 
Thus, PRPs do not suffer irreparable harm where they refuse to 
comply with an EPA cleanup order and successfully raise a good 
faith defense in the later enforcement action. Similarly, PRPs no 
longer face irreparable harm where they choose to comply first and 
challenge administrative orders later.l28 SARA amended CERCLA 
to provide that a PRP who complies with an EPA order may file 
suit to seek reimbursement from the Superfund on the grounds that 
the PRP is not liable for response costs or that the EPA-ordered 
response action was arbitrary and capricious. 129 
The good faith defense and the provision for reimbursement from 
the Superfund in all likelihood cured the due process concerns relat-
ing to CERCLA's penalty provisions. The courts' analyses of these 
issues, however, illustrate again that in the context of a public health 
statute such as CERCLA, delayed judicial review does not offend 
125 The good faith defense is based on the "sufficient cause" language of sections 106(b) and 
107(c)(3) of CERCLA. Solid State, 812 F.2d at 390-91; Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 
310, 316 (2d Cir. 1986); Wagner Elec., 612 F. Supp. at 744-45; United States v. Reilly Tar & 
Chern. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 418-19 (D. Minn. 1985). 
Section 106(b) allows the imposition of fines on "[a]ny person who, without sufficient cause, 
willfully violates, or fails or refuses to comply with" an administrative order issued under 
CERCLA. CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b). Similarly, section 107(c)(3) authorizes the 
award of punitive damages against "any person . . . liable for a release or threat of release of 
a hazardous substance [who] fails without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or 
remedial action" as ordered under CERCLA. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3). 
126 Solid State, 812 F.2d at 391; Wagner Seed, 800 F.2d at 315-16; Wagner Elec., 612 F. 
Supp. at 745. The court in Wagner Electric, however, held that providing a good faith defense 
satisfies due process requirements only if the reviewing court is not limited to the adminis-
trative record. 612 F. Supp. at 747-48. This qualification addresses concerns raised about the 
constitutionality of section 113(j), which limits review of EPA response actions to the admin-
istrative record. See supra note 111 and accompanying text, for a discussion of due process 
challenges to section 113(j). 
127 Wagner Seed, 800 F.2d at 316. 
128 See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
129 CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2). Thus, "parties wishing to avoid treble 
liability may apparently perform any required cleanup, with the assurances that if recovery 
is unavailable from a third party and they are not a responsible party, recovery may be had 
from Superfund." Solid State, 812 F.2d at 389 n.9. 
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due process as long as all defenses may be raised at that time and 
no legal deprivation may occur prior to the hearing. lao 
C. The CERCLA Lien Violates Due Process 
The same reasoning that led courts to conclude that CERCLA's 
pre-enforcement review and penalty provisions do not violate due 
process mandates the opposite conclusion when applied to CER-
CLA's lien provision. The lien is distinguishable in two important 
aspects from other CERCLA provisions that have been unsuccess-
fully challenged on due process grounds: the lien affects significant 
property interests, not merely financial interests; and the lien's im-
pact is immediate and irreparable. Although the landowner may 
challenge the lien's validity if the EPA initiates a subsequent en-
forcement or cost recovery action, such delayed judicial review can-
not vitiate the harm that arises upon the filing of the lien. 131 
As the Reardon court noted, the adverse effects of the CERCLA 
lien are numerous. l32 The lien clouds title, impairs the ability to 
alienate the property, taints credit, imperils opportunities for loans 
and mortgages, and may place an existing mortgage in default. 133 
This harm is compounded considerably where the lien is for an 
indefinite amount and encompasses future unlrnown expenditures, 
or where the lien remains in effect for years until the EPA decides 
not to pursue a cost recovery action against the owner or merely 
allows the statute of limitations to run. l34 Thus, an owner who has 
a valid defense to CERCLA liability or to the scope of the lien may 
never be able to raise that defense before a court while the land 
remains unjustifiably encumbered and the owner remains susceptible 
to loss of commercial opportunities, damage to credit or goodwill, 
financial loss, or even loss of the property by foreclosure. l35 A sub-
sequent hearing, if one ever occurs, cannot alleviate this harm. 
The due process analysis in Reardon is not inconsistent with the 
thinking of other courts which have reviewed CERCLA due process 
claims. Even though courts have been willing, in the face of CER-
CLA's important public health purpose, to relax strict due process 
requirements, they have been careful to ensure that PRPs still have 
130 See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. 
131 Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1519-20 (1st Cir. 1991). 
132 [d. at 1518. 
133 [d. at 1518 (quoting Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2113). 
134 [d. at 1519. 
135 See generally id. at 1518-23. 
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an opportunity for a judicial hearing prior to facing deprivation of 
legal rights. 136 The nature of the CERCLA lien renders it impossible 
to provide such an opportunity after the lien has attached. The 
Reardon court recognized this fatal distinction and properly declared 
the lien provision unconstitutional. 137 
V. DUE PROCESS AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LIENS 
Currently, twenty-one states authorize liens to secure cleanup 
costs incurred by state environmental protection agencies. 138 The 
general format of the majority of these statutes mimics section 
107(l)-the lien arises upon the state's expenditure of cleanup funds, 
and it becomes immediately effective when notice of the lien is filed 
in the county where the property is located. 139 Many of the state lien 
provisions impose much more onerous burdens on property owners 
than does the federal lien. For example, state liens may attach to 
noncontaminated property or take priority over all previously per-
fected encumbrances. 14o Most of the state statutes, however, do not 
meet the minimum due process requirements set forth in Reardon. 
The Reardon court's well-reasoned opinion should serve as a warning 
to numerous state legislatures that their environmental lien provi-
sions may not pass constitutional muster and should be reformed. 
A. State Superliens 
Several states authorize environmental liens with "superpriority" 
status. 141 These liens assume priority over all other existing, as well 
as subsequent, liens, encumbrances, and security interests on the 
property.142 The liens may attach to the hazardous waste site, as 
well as to all other property owned by the liable party including 
noncontaminated realty, personal property, and business reve-
136 See supra notes 112, 113, & 127 and accompanying text. 
137 See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1518-20 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Doehr, 
111 S. Ct. at 2118. 
138 See statutes cited supra note 11. 
139 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-417, -516 (Michie 1991). 
140 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :lO-b (1990). The New Hampshire lien 
encompasses all business revenues and all real and personal property of any person liable for 
all hazardous waste cleanup costs incurred by the state. [d. 
141 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2281 (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West 1989); MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :lO-b (1990); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23. 11f(f) (West 1992). 
142 See statutes cited supra note 141. 
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nues. l43 None of the superlien statutes requires pre-attachment no-
tice or hearing. Under the Reardon analysis they all violate due 
process. 144 
The superlien impacts on all aspects of property ownership and 
transactions. For example, financing the purchase of real or personal 
property is risky where the lender does not know that the property 
is contaminated and subject to a superior environmental lien. 145 This 
is particularly problematic, because the superlien statutes provide 
no period of time in which the state must recognize that a claim for 
cleanup costs exists and file the lien. In fact, the state may file the 
lien many years after the pollution occurred or was cleaned up. 146 
Also, the existence of a superlien affects a secured lender's ability 
to ensure repayment of the loan. Foreclosing on a lien is ineffective 
if a superior environmental lien is large enough. 147 
143 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 
(Law. Co-op. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :1O-b (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-
23.lIf(f) (West 1992). The liens have superpriority only as they apply to the realty, personalty, 
and business revenues of the site itself. As to all other attachable property or revenues, the 
liens have priority only over subsequent encumbrances. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, 
§ 1371 (West 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :10-b (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.llf(f) (West 1992). 
144 See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1517-24 (1st Cir. 1991); see also supra 
notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
145 Johnine ~r. Brown, Superfunds and Superliens: Super Problems for Secured Lenders, 3 
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1131, 1134 (Mar. 16, 1988); PLI REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 322, IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON BUSI-
NESS TRANSACTIONS, 1988, at 445, 454. It has been suggested that the lender protect its 
interests by requiring the borrower to covenant not to permit environmental liens to be placed 
on the property. See id. at 460. Breach of this covenant would constitute a technical default 
and enable th~l lender to accelerate the loan. [d. This proposal, however, does not protect the 
lender from the lien's priority status and its threat to full repayment of the loan. 
146 Richard L. Epling, Environmental Liens in Bankruptcy, 44 Bus. LAW. 85, 87 (1988). 
A title search will not reveal the potential existence of the superlien, even though the property 
may be subject for many years to an ongoing governmental investigation and hazardous 
substance cleanup, during which a lien could be imposed at any time. The presence of hazardous 
material on land, and the concomitant possibility of governmental liens, does not constitute a 
title defect covered by a title insurance policy. See Lick Mill Creek Apartments v. Chicago 
Title Ins. Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 231, 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Kumar, 
506 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). 
This problem is alleviated in states which require the government to record notice as soon 
as it designates the property as a contaminated site or begins to expend funds to investigate 
or clean up the property. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-209 (1992). 
147 Brown, supra note 145, at 454. Proponents of superliens justify this result on the theory 
that the contaminated property is virtually worthless until it is cleaned up. Bozarth, supra 
note 72, at 3:~2. A lender with a security interest in the land should not receive a windfall 
when the state spends its money to finance the cleanup. [d. This rationalization fails to justify 
the superpriority of liens on personal property and business revenues. See id. 
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Furthermore, the superlien may upset traditional business expec-
tations, such as bankruptcy proceedings. 148 Where the environmental 
lien takes priority and depletes the estate in its entirety, the claims 
of perfected, secured creditors--ordinarily paid first-are worth-
less. 149 
Real estate developers, investors, lenders, and title insurers have 
all become more cautious in property transactions as a result of the 
environmental lien. 150 The title insurance industry, for example, has 
responded to the existence of superliens by revising standard con-
tract forms, expanding title searches, and receiving from the EPA 
periodic lists of properties on which CERCLA liens have been 
filed. 151 
As with the CERCLA lien, the potential harm from improper 
imposition of a superlien is immediate and irreparable. Without pro-
visions for pre-attachment notice and hearing, the superlien statutes 
are unconstitutional. 152 
B. State Lien Provisions Relating to Due Process 
Although none of the state lien statutes is constitutionally perfect, 
various provisions do provide some procedural due process safe-
guards and illustrate useful elements of a model environmental lien 
statute. 
1. Pre-attachment Judicial Determination 
Maryland authorizes an environmental lien only as to penalties 
that have been assessed in a civil action or in an administrative 
action subject to judicial review. 153 Similarly, the Montana lien arises 
only as to "costs, penalties, and natural resource damages for which 
a person has been judicially determined to be liable to the state."l54 
148 Beth Anne Smith, Comment, State "Superlien" Statutes: An Attempt to Resolve the 
Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and Environmental Law, 59 TEMPLE L.Q. 981, 1009 
(1986). 
149 [d. 
150 Norman R. Newman, How to Counsel the Land Developer on Superfund and Superliens, 
34 PRAC. LAW, No.7, at 13, 22-26 (1988). 
151 Bozarth, supra note 72, at 313-14. 
152 Interestingly, the trend toward superliens has faltered recently. Since 1988, Arkansas 
and Tennessee deleted superlien provisions from their cleanup statutes, and efforts to create 
environmental superliens in Kansas, New York, and Pennsylvania were defeated. [d. at 324. 
153 MD. ENVIR. CODE ANN. §§ 7-264, -266 (Supp. 1992). 
154 MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-720 (1991). 
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In a unique provision, the Ohio lien arises only upon breach of the 
reimbursement provisions of a voluntary agreement between the 
landowner and the state. l55 These lien provisions do not have due 
process problems, because the liens serve merely as collection tools 
for judicially determined or voluntarily assumed debts. 
2. Pre-attachment Administrative Hearing 
Similar to the CERCLA lien, Minnesota's environmental lien at-
taches as soon as the state incurs cleanup costs, notifies the owner 
in writing of potential cleanup liability, and files the lien notice. 156 
The state statute, however, is more protective of due process rights 
than is CERCLA, because the state may not file the lien until the 
owner has been notified of the state's intention to file the lien, and 
has had an opportunity to appear before the state environmental 
protection agency, which must approve or disapprove the lien within 
thirty days.157 Although this procedure gives the owner a pre-at-
tachment opportunity to challenge liability or the validity of the lien, 
without a provision allowing for judicial review of the agency's de-
cision, the lien does not satisfy the Reardon due process standard. 158 
3. Time Limitation for Filing Lien 
Three states set time limits within which the government may file 
a lien for environmental cleanup costs. In Arkansas, the notice of 
lien must be filed within thirty days of the state's last cleanup act 
performed on the property.159 Likewise, Tennessee law requires the 
state to file its lien within one year of cleanup completion. 160 In Iowa, 
the state perfects the lien by filing a statement of claim within 120 
days after costs are incurred. 161 By setting a definite time frame 
within which the property may be encumbered, these provisions 
165 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.22 (Anderson 1992). 
156 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.672 (West 1990). 
167 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.673 (West 1990). 
156 The Minnesota Environmental Compensation and Liability Act does not specifically pro-
vide for judicial review of administrative actions taken under the Act. See MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 115B.01-.37 (West 1990). Thus, a challenge to the lien must be asserted in accordance with 
the state's Administrative Procedure Act, which allows judicial review only of final agency 
action. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.001-.69 (West 1990). 
169 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-417, -516 (Michie 1991). 
160 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-209 (1992). 
161 IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.396 (West 1990). 
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avoid the harsh consequences possible under CERCLA of a lien filed 
many years after the pollution or cleanup occurs. 162 
4. Post-attachment Review 
The state statutes vary in their approaches to providing for ad-
ministrative or judicial review of the filing' of an environmental lien. 
The most severe restriction of post-attachment review is imposed in 
Michigan and Pennsylvania. l63 Both states follow section 113(h), ab-
solutely prohibiting judicial review of agency action prior to the state 
initiating an enforcement or cost recovery lawsuit. l64 Due to the 
similarity between these state statutory schemes and CERCLA, it 
is likely that the same challenge may be asserted successfully against 
the states' bar of pre-enforcement review of due process claims as 
was addressed in Reardon. 165 
Other states have no specific provisions within their CERCLA 
counterparts regarding judicial review of administrative action. l66 In 
these jurisdictions, challenges to environmental liens must be as-
serted in accordance with the states' administrative procedure acts, 
which generally allow judicial review only of final agency action and 
after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 167 Whether the filing 
of a lien constitutes final, and thus reviewable, agency action must 
be determined according to each state's laws. 
Environmental cleanup statutes that provide an opportunity for a 
post-attachment administrative hearing to challenge agency action 
and for immediate judicial review following the administrative hear-
ing offer greater due process safeguards. l68 In Kentucky, for exam-
162 See supra notes 142 & 143 and accompanying text. 
163 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.32(16a) (Callaghan Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§ 6020.509 (Supp. 1992). 
164 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.32(16a) (Callaghan Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§ 6020.509 (Supp. 1992). Like section 113(j) of CERCLA, these states also limit judicial review 
to the administrative record. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.32(16a) (Callaghan Supp. 1992); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.509 (Supp. 1992). 
166 See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1517-24 (lst Cir. 1991); see also supra 
notes 52-75 and accompanying text. 
166 See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-417, 8-7-516 (Michie 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, 
§ 1021.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.7-10.7 (West Supp. 1992); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 455B.396 (West 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West Supp. 1992); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:2, :10-b 
(1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-209 (1992). 
167 See statutes cited supra note 166. 
168 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.560, 46.03.820, 46.08.140 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 22a-436, -437 (West Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.071, .083, .085 (Baldwin 
232 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:203 
pIe, a PRP has the right to an administrative hearing within ten 
days after receiving a pollution abatement order from the state 
environmental agency.169 The administrative hearing decision then 
may be appealed to the state court within thirty days. 170 
Despite providing for prompt administrative and judicial review 
of agency action, this latter group of statutes still fails the Doehr 
and Reardon constitutionality test. Post-attachment review may sat-
isfy due process requirements only where the state has shown that 
exigent circumstances justify a departure from pre-attachment no-
tice and hearing. l7l 
The state environmental liens for the most part are very similar 
to the CERCLA lien and are part of state statutory schemes modeled 
after CERCLA. An analysis of their comportment with due process 
is therefore exactly the same as that applied to the CERCLA lien 
in Reardon.172 Under this analysis, the vast majority of the state 
statutes will fall to a due process challenge. 173 State legislatures 
should accept the inevitability of constitutionally mandated lien re-
form. 
VI. THE MODEL ENVIRONMENTAL LIEN STATUTE 
It is not difficult to envision an environmental lien statute that 
satisfies due process without unduly burdening governmental efforts 
to promptly, effectively, and efficiently clean up hazardous waste 
sites. This model statute arises from a consideration of due process 
safeguards that courts have analyzed in CERCLA cases, procedures 
suggested by Reardon, and selected provisions already extant in 
state lien statutes. 174 
1982 & Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1365 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 10 (Law. Co-op. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 466.190 (1991). 
169 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.071 (Baldwin 1982). 
170 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.085 (Baldwin Supp. 1991). 
171 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
172 See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1517-24 (1st Cir. 1991); see also supra 
notes 54-75 and accompanying text. 
173 To date, not one state lien statute has been challenged on due process grounds. The 
dearth of reported cases regarding environmental liens may be the result of the lien not being 
used frequently by environmental agencies. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. More-
over, some environmental lien statutes are relatively new and thus have not been on the 
legislative books long enough to have sparked reported litigation. In one exception, Kessler 
v. Tarrats, the New Jersey superlien was challenged as an unconstitutional impairment of 
contract and taking of property without compensation. 476 A.2d 326 (N.J. 1984). The lien 
provision was upheld. See id. at 331-32. 
174 See infra: Appendix for a suggested model environmental lien statute. 
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The lien statute must provide, at the minimum, pre-attachment 
notice and hearing, at which the owner may challenge the validity 
of the lien. 175 In accordance with the notion that due process is 
flexible, especially in the public health arena, a full trial is not 
required. 176 In the noticed hearing before a judge, the government 
need only establish probable cause to believe that the owner is liable 
for cleanup costs and the land is subject to the cleanup action. 177 To 
further streamline the hearing process, discovery is limited. The 
owner has the right to present evidence of a defense to liability for 
cleanup costs or to the scope of the proposed lien. This provides the 
owner with judicial review prior to agency action and thus prior to 
any legal deprivation of property rights. It provides greater due 
process safeguards than the ex parte procedure struck as unconsti-
tutional in Doehr,178 yet it does not burden the government with a 
protracted and expensive pre-enforcement trial. 
Alternatively, the statute may provide for a pre-attachment ad-
ministrative hearing, at which the owner has the opportunity to 
personally appear and challenge the propriety of the proposed lien. 179 
The government may find it more cost-effective to consider the 
owner's objections to the proposed lien in an administrative pro-
ceeding, prior to deciding whether to further pursue the lien in 
court. 180 In conjunction with the pre-attachment administrative hear-
ing, however, the statute should provide for judicial de novo review 
of the administrative decision. During judicial review, the owner 
may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 181 
175 See Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1523-24. The Michigan lien statute provides a model for a pre-
attachment hearing. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.32(16a) (Callaghan Supp. 1992). If the state 
determines that the automatic lien on the contaminated site is insufficient to protect the state's 
interest in recovering cleanup costs, the state may petition the court for a lien on other 
property owned by the responsible party. [d. The court may order such a lien only after notice 
to the owner and a hearing on the merits of the government's petition. [d. 
176 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1522. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. at 1523. 
179 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.673 (West 1990). 
ISO At least two courts have suggested that administrative hearings held early in the CER-
CLA process not only would alleviate due process concerns but also would promote more 
effective enforcement of CERCLA. See Solid State Circuits v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 392 (8th 
Cir. 1987)(informal administrative hearings to enable PRP to challenge validity of EPA cleanup 
order will "best protect interests of all concerned and promote faster more efficient cleanup 
while making certain that liability remains with those responsible"); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. 
Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 749 (D. Kan. 1985) (expedited administrative hearing at which 
EPA presents evidence of party's responsibility would promote rational public policy). 
181 De novo review will avoid due process problems arising from restricting judicial review 
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The model lien statute provides an exception to the hearing re-
quirement in the event of exigent circumstances, such as the immi-
nent bankruptcy of the landowner or transfer of the property. 182 This 
exception is strictly limited to the government's showing, through 
sworn affidavit or testimony under oath, that an emergency exists 
that will jeopardize the government's right to recover cleanup costs. 
After a judge makes an ex parte determination that the govern-
ment may file the lien, an immediate post-attachment judicial hearing 
must be held. l83 This provision protects due process by requiring 
evidence of an emergency prior to unilateral administrative action, 
yet it also protects the public interest in empowering the government 
with emergency response powers and in guaranteeing reimburse-
ment of public funds. To guard against abuse of the emergency 
exception, the statute provides for the owner's recovery of damages 
and costs in the event that a judge determines that either there was 
no reasonable basis to believe an emergency existed or that the ex 
parte lien is otherwise invalid. 184 
Finally, to avoid indefinite exposure to potential governmental 
attachment of private property, the statute prohibits liens for an 
indefinite amount and sets a time limit within which the government 
must file the lien. 185 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The judiciary consistently has been reluctant to find merit in due 
process challenges to CERCLA. This is not surprising considering 
the potentially devastating environmental problems CERCLA was 
enacted to remedy. The environmental lien, however, presents a 
situation distinguishable from that considered in prior CERCLA due 
process cases. The delayed judicial review that satisfied other due 
process concerns simply is not adequate in the environmental lien 
context. 
The CERCLA lien provision, as well as most state lien provisions, 
apparently were enacted with a legislative eye to assisting govern-
mental cost recovery activity and without considered analysis of due 
process requirements. Environmental liens carry the potential for 
to the administrative record and possibly foreclosing the opportunity to fully present defenses 
to the court. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
182 See Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1521-22. 
183 I d. at 15:22. 
184 Id. at 15:20. 
185 See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text. 
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burdensome interference with commercial transactions and irrepar-
able consequences to landowners. In light of the compelling reason-
ing of Reardon, Congress and many state legislatures should reform 
their respective environmental lien provisions to provide the appro-
priate procedural safeguards, both satisfactory to due process and 
compatible with effective hazardous waste cleanup. 
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APPENDIX 
MODEL ENVIRONMENTAL LIEN STATUTE 
1. Lien: All costs of removal or remedial action for which a person 
[hereinafter "owner"] is liable to the [federal or state] government 
shaH constitute a lien in favor of the government upon all real prop-
erty [hereinafter "property"] 
a. that is owned by the person at the time the lien notice is filed; 
and 
b. upon which the removal or remedial action is undertaken. 
2. Attachment: The lien attaches when: 
a. costs are incurred by the government with respect to a removal 
or remedial action; 
b. the owner is provided by certified or registered mail with 
written notice of potential liability; 
c. a petition for lien has been granted in accordance with subsec-
tion 7; and 
d. notice of lien has been filed as provided in subsection 3. 
3. Notice of Lien: 
a. Contents: The notice of lien must include: 
(1) the name of the record owner of the real property where the 
lien attached; 
(2) the legal description of the real property where the lien 
attached; 
(3) the amount of the lien; 
(4) a statement that a removal or remedial action under [the 
applicable federal or state statute], for which costs have been in-
curred, has been undertaken on the property; 
(5) a statement that an environmental lien has attached to the 
property; and 
(6) a copy of the order of the court granting the petition for lien. 
b. Filing: All documents required to be filed under this subsection 
must be filed in the office of the county recorder where the property 
is located. A copy of the notice of lien shall be sent by certified or 
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registered mail, to each person of record holding an interest in the 
property. 
4. Lien Priority: The lien is subject to the rights of any other person, 
including an owner, purchaser, holder of a mortgage or security 
interest, or judgment lien creditor, whose interest is perfected be-
fore a notice of lien has been filed pursuant to subsection 3. 
5. Release: The government shall execute and file a release of an 
environmental lien when 
a. the lien is satisfied; 
b. after the lien is issued pursuant to ex parte order, a court 
determines that the lien is unenforceable; or 
c. a legally enforceable agreement has been executed by the owner 
relating to taking the response action or reimbursing the government 
for cleanup expenditures. 
6. Duration: A lien created under this section continues until the 
earlier of: 
a. full discharge and satisfaction of the lien; 
b. expiration of 10 years from the creation of the lien, unless an 
action to foreclose on the lien is pending; or 
c. release of the lien. 
7. Judicial Determination: No lien shall attach or be modified except 
upon order by the [federal or state] court as provided in this sub-
section. 
a. Petition for lien: Within one year of the date the government 
incurs costs with respect to a removal or remedial action, and after 
the owner is provided by certified or registered mail With written 
notice of potential liability for said costs, the government may file a 
petition in the court with jurisdiction over the county in which the 
property is located, seeking a lien upon the property in favor of the 
government. A petition submitted pursuant to this subsection shall 
include: 
(1) a description of the property to be attached; 
(2) an Affidavit of Expenditures setting forth the total amount 
of the lien and itemizing the expenditures; 
(3) with as much specificity as possible, the facts upon which 
the government believes that there is probable cause to issue the 
lien; and 
(4) proof of personal service of the petition and supporting doc-
uments on the owner. 
b. Probable cause hearing: 
(1) Upon receipt of a petition under this subsection, the court 
shall promptly schedule a hearing to determine whether the petition 
should be granted. 
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(2) Notice of the hearing shall be provided to the owner and any 
persons holding liens or perfected security interests in the property. 
(3) The owner shall have the right to be present at the hearing, 
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and to present 
argument and legal briefing to the court. The [applicable federal or 
state] rules of evidence and of civil procedure shall apply; except 
that the right of discovery shall be limited to those documents relied 
upon by the opposing party during the hearing. 
(4) The court may grant the petition only upon a showing by 
the government that there is probable cause to believe that the 
owner is liable to the government for removal or remedial costs 
under [the applicable federal or state statute]; and the property to 
be attached is subject to the action for which costs have been in-
curred. 
(5) The amount of the lien shall not exceed that amount set forth 
in the Affidavit of Expenditures. 
c. Ex parte order: A lien may attach upon ex parte order by the 
court within one year of the date the government incurred costs 
with respect to a removal or remedial action, and after the owner 
has been provided by certified or registered mail with written notice 
of potential liability for said costs. An ex parte order may be issued 
only upon a showing by the government by sworn affidavit or tes-
timony under oath that there is probable cause to believe that: 
(1) exigent circumstances exist such that the interest of the 
government in obtaining reimbursement for cleanup costs will be 
jeopardized, if a probable cause hearing as provided in this subsec-
tion is held; 
(2) the owner is liable to the government for costs under [the 
applicable federal or state statute]; and 
(3) the property to be attached is subject to the removal or 
remedial action for which costs have been incurred. 
d. Within 15 days after an ex parte order is issued authorizing the 
lien to attach, a probable cause hearing must be held pursuant to 
this subsection. 
e. Modification of lien: A lien filed pursuant to this section may 
be modified to include subsequently incurred costs only in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in this subsection. 
8. Damages: If a lien is filed pursuant to an ex parte order and the 
court later det~rmines that the lien is invalid or otherwise unenforce-
able, the owner may be awarded damages, costs, and attorneys fees 
incurred as a result of the attachment of the lien. 
